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Abstract
Using data on the age, sex, ethnicity and criminal involvement of 14.3 million resi-
dents aged 10–89 residing in 4,007 neighborhoods in the Netherlands, this article
tests whether an individual’s decision whether or not to be involved in crime is
affected by the number of criminals in the neighborhood. Controlling for unobserved
neighborhood heterogeneity and endogeneity of this decision, a small positive effect
is found on violent crime, but not on property crime. The results suggest that
individual characteristics and other neighborhood characteristics play a much greater
role in an individual’s decision to be involved in crime.
Keywords: social interactions, neighborhoods, crime
JEL-classification: R1, R2
1. Introduction
The geographic variability of crime is a longstanding puzzle that was already studied
in the early 19th century by statisticians Quetelet (see Beirne, 1987) and Guerry (see
Friendly, 2007). A seminal paper on the topic (Glaeser et al., 1996, GSS hereafter)
analyzes data on 658 cities in the United States and 70 precincts in New York City.
Their findings demonstrate that for a variety of crime types, the variability in crime rates
cannot be explained by economic, social or legal differences between cities or precincts.
The authors conclude that the remaining variability should be attributed to ‘social
interactions’, a term that encompasses a variety of different nonmarket mechanisms but
is seldom explicitly defined (Manski, 2000). A common theme is the proposition that the
optimal choice of an individual depends on the choices of others, in particular others with
whom the individual interacts directly or vicariously. If people interact predominantly
with others who are geographically nearby, these interactions may provide an alternative
explanation for the geographical variability of crime.1
The present paper builds on the argumentation of GSS, but utilizes data that are better
suited to gauge the effect of social interactions on an individual’s criminal behavior in
three important ways. First, our analysis utilizes data measured at a much smaller
spatial scale. Whereas GSS apply their model to cities and to precincts as spatial units of
analysis, we use Dutch neighborhoods that have an average population of 4,000 residents
and an average surface of 10 square kilometer (approximately 4 square miles). The
detailed spatial scale is not only important for statistical reasons (e.g., it assures less
heterogeneity within and more heterogeneity between observations) but also from a
substantive point of view. In order for the choices of individuals to be affected by the
1See, for instance, Case and Katz (1991), Freeman et al. (1996) and Zenou (2003) and the references
cited in these papers for further empirical evidence, Ballester et al. (2010) for a theoretical analysis of
delinquent networks in the tradition of Becker (1968) and Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004) for the
presence of multiple equilibriums.
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choices of others in their environment, they must be aware of these choices. Given the
limited spatial awareness of individuals, they are much more likely to be aware of the
behaviors of the residents in their own neighborhood than of the behaviors of residents
in remote parts of their city or region.
Second, our analysis directly applies to individual choices. GSS have only access to
crime rates, i.e. annual numbers of crimes per capita committed within the geographic
boundaries of cities or precincts. This requires them to make assumptions on the numbers
of crimes committed per criminal. Our data apply to individual neighborhood residents,
which allows us to analyze offender rates (percentages of neighborhood residents suspected
of being involved in crime in a given year) rather than crime rates. This allows us to
separate crimes from offenders, i.e. choices from agents.
The third advantage of our study is the inclusion of individual characteristics (sex, age
and ethnic origin) that are strongly correlated with criminal involvement. In contrast to
GSS, who rely on aggregate population characteristics, we analyze individual data that
are both comprehensive and detailed. This allows us to take into account stylized facts
about individual determinants of criminal conduct, such as the overrepresentation of
males, adolescents and non-native residents among the criminal population. Our analysis
includes the age (16 categories), sex (male versus female), ethnic origin (native versus
foreign), neighborhood of residence (4,000 neighborhoods) and criminal record of the
complete registered 2006 population aged 10–89 of The Netherlands. The sample totals
14.3 million residents of whom just over 21,300 were registered for being suspected by
the police of having committed a crime in 2006. As far as we know no prior study has
been based on such a large dataset of individual records.
Our empirical work is based on a binomial choice model of the individual’s choice of
whether or not to be a criminal. Explanatory variables include individual as well as
neighborhood characteristics. The fraction of criminals in the neighborhood is included
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in the latter group. Identification of endogenous social interactions is complicated by the
‘reflection problem’ Manski (1993). Brock and Durlauf (2001) provide a set of conditions
under which such social interactions are identified in binomial discrete choice models. To
address unobserved heterogeneity, which could bias the measurement of social interactions,
we employ the methodology of Berry et al. (1995). In addition, we tackle the endogeneity
of a possible social interaction effect with an artificial instrumental variable.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
economic and criminological literature on crime and social interactions. Section 3
addresses the model and the estimation methodology. Section 4 extensively describes the
data used. Section 5 presents the findings, after which the final section concludes and
provides suggestions for future research.
2. Literature
As GSS argue, high geographic variability of crime rates implies that the behavior of
two people living in the same geographic area is on average more similar than the
behavior of two people living in different geographic areas. Manski (1993) distinguishes
between three mechanisms that can create behavioral similarity in groups. The first
mechanism is endogenous interaction, in which the propensity of an individual to behave
in some way (e.g., commit crime) varies with the behavior of the group (e.g., the
proportion of group members that are criminals). The second mechanism is exogeneous
or contextual interaction, in which the propensity of an individual to behave in some
way varies with exogenous characteristics of the group members (e.g., age and gender
composition). The third mechanism is correlated effects, in which individuals in the
same group behave similarly only because they have similar unobserved individual
characteristics or face similar unobserved constraints (in our case these are unobserved
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neighborhood characteristics influencing crime rates). Correlated effects represent a
non-causal mechanism, even if group membership (e.g., living in the same neighborhood)
is caused by self-selection on exogenous characteristics (e.g. aﬄuence or race).
In contrast to correlated effects, endogenous and contextual interactions are causal effects.
Manski notes that interest in both types of interactions marks a disciplinary divide:
whereas sociology has emphasized contextual interactions, the interest of economics
has been primarily in the behavioral interdependence and feedback loops implied by
endogenous interactions. Endogenous interaction generates a multiplier effect on the
impact of other explanatory variables on the probability of choosing to be a criminal.
This multiplier effect is at the heart of the necessity of introducing social interactions to
explain the geographical variation of crime rates.
In criminological research, it has long been observed that peer delinquency and individual
delinquency are correlated, i.e. that those who break the law tend to associate with
others who also break the law, although empirically the proposition is tested almost
exclusively amongst juveniles, not adults. Two mechanisms have been hypothesized to
underlie that correlation. The first mechanism is social learning (Sutherland, 1947; Akers,
1985), according to which criminal behavior is learned from delinquent peers. People are
more likely to commit crime if peers also commit crime and learning includes being taught
the tangible techniques of committing crime, but also learning cognitive techniques of
neutralization to overcome moral concerns (Sykes and Matza, 1957). This mechanism is
an example of both contextual interaction with regard to learning specific skills, but also
endogenous interaction because it implies behavioral interdependence.
The second mechanism is group selection. According to this argument, criminality itself
is caused by other factors (such as weak social bonds or low self-control, see Gottfredson
and Hirschi, 1990), and the propensity of an individual to be a criminal is not caused by
the company of criminal friends. Instead, causality runs the other way: criminals tend to
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seek the company of other criminals. Because association is also based on geographical
proximity (Festinger et al., 1950), peer group or neighborhood selection induces behavioral
similarity in criminality. This mechanism is an example of correlated effects, and not
driven by behavioral independence with respect to the decision to become a criminal.
The correlation between peer delinquency and individual delinquency is thus hypothesized
to be affected by processes of selection and influence in social interactions between peers.
In one of the first criminological studies to employ longitudinal network analyses to
study the causal ordering of selection and influence, Weerman (2011) shows that only
the average delinquency level of someone’s friends in the school network has a significant,
although relatively small, effect on individual delinquent behavior. Patacchini and Zenou
(2012) also study delinquency in peer networks and find a ‘conformism’ effect of peers’
delinquency for all crimes but especially for petty crimes.
Social influence thus seems to be most important to explain the correlation between peer
delinquency and individual delinquency. Measuring the full extent of social networks
to identify and estimate social interactions may, however, be unnecessary restrictive,
because social interactions are likely to play a role not only in networks of strong ties,
but also in networks of weak ties. Social interactions include mechanisms that do not
rely on the identification of other individuals. For example, an individual’s decision to
commit crime may be affected by merely observing the behavior of unknown others, or
even by just observing the outcomes of it (e.g., vandalism), and inferring the behavior.
In this paper, we focus on the endogenous interactions between neighborhood residents,
and test the hypothesis that, all other things being equal, an individual’s decision to
be a criminal positively depends on the proportion of neighborhood residents that are
criminals. Thus, we expect that one’s behavior is influenced by observing or learning
about the behavior of other neighborhood residents. Relevant examples for the purposes
of this paper are (i) see crime take place, (ii) hear about crime taking place from offenders
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and/or victims in one’s peer group, (iii) see the results of crime, and (iv) become a victim
of crime.
A focus on the neighborhood as the presumed unit of analysis where individuals interact
with each other seems logical, given the wealth of published research on neighborhood
effects (for an overview of outcomes unrelated to crime, see Sampson et al., 2002). As Shaw
and McKay (1969) pointed out in their highly influential work: “Heavy concentration of
delinquency in certain areas means [. . . ] that boys living in these areas are in contact
not only with individuals who engage in proscribed activity but also with groups which
sanction such behavior and exert pressure upon their members to conform to group
standards” (p. 174). The neighborhood is an important context for studying the role of
social interactions in crime, not only for adolescent boys, as the above quote suggests,
but for neighborhood residents of both sexes and all ages.
We analyse property crime and violent crime separately as well as jointly in an overall
measure that includes both types of crime. The rationale is that if criminal social
interactions exist, they may be crime type specific. This would imply that an individual’s
decision to become involved in property crime depends on the proportion of property
offenders (but not on the proportion of offenders of a different type of crime) in his or her
environment, and that the probability to become involved in violent crime depends on
the proportion of violent offenders (but not on the proportion of other types of offenders)
in the area. Violent crime includes offences like assault, domestic violence and robbery.
Property crime includes offences like burglary, shoplifting and fraud. Because violent
crime has a strong reciprocal nature (assault often takes place for reasons of revenge, and
the perpetrators of assault are often identified while those of property crime often are
not), we hypothesize that the social interaction effect for violent crime is larger than for
property crime.
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3. The Model
This section presents the model and the method of estimation. We use a binomial logit
model for the choice whether or not to be a criminal. This choice is determined by
personal characteristics as well as neighborhood characteristics. Idiosyncratic differences
in individual choice behavior are captured by the conventional logit error term. We
also address unobserved neighborhood effects, by introducing elements of the approach
pioneered by Berry et al. (1995) along the lines of Walker et al. (2011) in their model
of social interactions in travel mode choice. Subsequently, we deal with the issue of
correct identification of the social interaction effect, and we address the endogeneity of
the social interaction effect. The final subsection discusses an implication of our model:
the existence of multiple neighborhood crime rate equilibriums.
3.1. The choice of whether or not to be a criminal
The model we use focuses on the an individual’s choice of whether or not to be a
criminal. An individual decides to either be a criminal or not. The choice depends on
personal and neighborhood characteristics, not all of which are observed. Let Cij be a
zero-one variable that indicates whether individual i in neighborhood j is a criminal.
The probability that Cij equals 1 (indicating that person i is a criminal) depends on
personal characteristics Xi, and on neighborhood characteristics Zj . A social interaction
effect is present if the expected value of the variable Cj in neighborhood j has an impact
on the probability that a particular individual i chooses to be a criminal. Since we are
not informed about all the relevant characteristics, we introduce two random variables
representing unobserved characteristics: i for unobserved personal characteristics and ξj
for unobserved neighborhood characteristics. We now define a latent variable yij that is
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linear in these characteristics:
yij = αXij + βZj + γE(Cj) + ξj + ij . (1)
When this latent variable takes on a positive value, Cij = 1, otherwise Cij = 0.
If we assume the random variable i to be extreme value type I distributed the probability
that Cij = 1 is given by the logit expression:
Pr(Cij = 1) =
eαXi+βZj+γE(Cj)+ξj
1 + eαXi+βZj+γE(Cj)+ξj
. (2)
Without the social interaction and unobserved neighborhood effects (i.e., γ = ξj = 0), this
is a standard binomial logit model. When there is social interaction, but no unobserved
heterogeneity (ξj = 0), this is the logit version of the binomial model of Brock and
Durlauf (2001).
The unobserved heterogeneity term ξj captures neighbourhood characteristics that may
have an impact on an individual’s probability to become a criminal, but are unobserved by
the analyst. The importance of such unobserved heterogeneity in discrete choice models
is analyzed thoroughly by Berry et al. (1995) in their seminal study of the automobile
market. Their approach is used in other fields as well. For instance, Walker et al. (2011)
apply a model like (2), but without neighborhood variables Z, to study the effect of
social interactions on travel mode choice.
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3.2. Identification
Berry et al. (1995) suggest a two-stage procedure. In the first step the neighborhood-
specific terms are taken together in a single neighborhood constant δj .
Pr(Cij = 1) =
eαXi+δj
1 + eαXi+δj
, (3)
and this model is estimated in the usual way. In the second stage the alternative specific
constants are analyzed further by writing them again as:
δj = βZj + γE(Cj) + ξj . (4)
The unobserved heterogeneity terms ξj are now the residuals of the linear regression
equation. A complication is that OLS cannot be used, since E(Cj) is expected to be
correlated with ξj . The reason is that a high value of ξj makes it more likely that any
individual in the neighborhood is a criminal, which tends to increase E(Cj). Hence the
error term is not independent of the explanatory variables. In the next subsection we
will propose a solution to this problem using an instrumental variable approach.
Manski (1993) studies identification of a linear model with social interactions in which
there are endogenous interaction effects as well as contextual effects. In our model the
variable E(Cj) embodies an endogenous social interaction effect, while contextual effects
may be included in the vector Zj when it contains variables like the average age of
neighborhood inhabitants. In Manski’s model, the two effects cannot be distinguished.
Brock and Durlauf (2001) show that the nonlinearity that occurs in a discrete choice
model like (2) has identifying power. They develop a set of conditions under which all
the remaining parameters are identified. These conditions apply to the model (2) when
the term referring to unobserved heterogeneity is absent.
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The model (2) is identified if the parameters α and δ in (3) are identified and if the
parameters β and γ in (4) are identified. Manski (1988) shows that the multinomial
logit model is identified, so the first requirement is not a problem. Nor is the second.
In Manski’s linear model Cij is on the left-hand side of the linear equation of interest,
whereas in (4) it is the estimated neighborhood-specific constant δj . This is the reason
why Manski’s reflection problem does not occur in the present context.
However, there is another problem that has to be faced: the term ξj , which represents
unobserved heterogeneity, has an impact on all Cij ’s and therefore also on E(Cj). The
implication is that E(Cj) is potentially correlated with ξj . In the next subsection we will
propose an instrumental variable strategy to solve this problem.
3.3. Endogeneity
As an instrument we need additional variables that have no direct impact on δj , and
are correlated with E(Cj), but not with ξj . Walker et al. (2011) propose two types of
instruments: a spatial reference group, or the average social interaction effect of the
adjacent postal codes; a social reference group, variables that indicate whether inhabitants
of a neighborhood share similar socio-economic characteristics.
The intuition behind this approach is straightforward. E(Cj) is defined as the expected
number of criminals within a neighborhood. This can also be seen as the probability to
encounter a criminal within neighborhood j. Note that one of the main assumptions of
our model is that social interactions take place within a neighborhood. Thus, spatially
lagged encounter probabilities WE(Cj) are not correlated with the neighborhood specific
effect, but might contain information about E(Cj). Similarly, the social distance in the
neighborhood to other groups should be correlated with E(Cj) (it contains information
about the strength of the network and thus the intensity of the social interactions)
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and the correlation with the unobserved neighborhood characteristics is expected to be
rather weak. For instance, it can be argued that it is unlikely that a neighborhood’s age
structure correlates with the propensity of becoming a criminal other than via group
interactions.
However, these approaches are easy to criticize. It is not difficult to imagine social
interactions that cross the often somewhat arbitrary boundaries of zip code areas, which
would violate the exclusion restriction. It is also quite conceivable that the demographic
composition of a neighborhood has a direct impact on the probability that some of its
inhabitants become criminals. Given this criticism, it is advantageous that Bayer et al.
(2004) developed a procedure for constructing an instrument in the context of a model
for neighborhood sorting. We follow their suggestion here.
Start by observing that, according to the model, the expected crime rate is:
E(Cj) =
∑
i∈j
eαXi+βZj+γE(Cj)+ξj
1 + eαXi+βZj+γE(Cj)+ξj
 /Bj , (5)
where the summation is over all individuals living in neighborhood j and Bj is the
total number of these individuals. This equation must necessarily hold if the model is
consistent and can be interpreted as an equilibrium condition in our model of social
interaction. It is easy to verify that in (5) there is a positive correlation between the
unobserved neighborhood characteristics and the crime rate.
If we know the true values of the coefficients α,β,γ and the unobserved neighborhood
characteristics ξj we would be able to compute counterfactual choice probabilities, denoted
as IE(Cj)’s, for the situation in which unobserved neighborhood effects were absent,
that is for a situation in which all ξj ’s are equal to 0. The IE(Cj)’s are, by construction,
uncorrelated with the ξj ’s and in all probability highly correlated with the E(Cj)’s. Since
the exclusion restriction is also clearly satisfied, this constructed variable could serve as
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an instrument.
The instrument is thus computed by deleting the unobserved heterogeneity terms ξ from
(5) and computing the expected crime rate implied by the resulting equation:
IE(Cj) =
∑
i∈j
eαXi+βZj+γIE(Cj)
1 + eαXi+βZj+γIE(Cj)
 /Bj . (6)
A complication associated with implementing the suggested procedure is that (6) uses
the estimated coefficients of the model, which can only be obtained through the use of
the instrument. Bayer et al. (2004) and Bayer and Timmins (2007) therefore propose an
iterative procedure in which one starts with an informed guess of the instrument values,2
then computes the coefficient estimates and use them to re-compute the instrument, until
convergence is achieved.
3.4. Social interaction and multiple equilibriums
The implications of the presence of social interaction in our choice model at the neighbor-
hood level can be investigated on the basis of (5). We can interpret the right-hand side
of this equation as a mapping of E(Cj). To focus on essentials, we assume a population
with individuals that are identical (apart from the idiosyncratic term in the logit model)
and simplify (5) as:
E(Cj) =
eφj+γE(Cj)
1 + eφj+γE(Cj)
(7)
It is not difficult to verify that:
dE(Cj)
dφj
= 11− γE(Cj)(1− E(Cj)E(Cj)(1− E(Cj)) (8)
2One can, for instance, use OLS estimation of (4).
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The first term on the right-hand side is a multiplier that equals 1 if there is no social
interaction (γ = 0) and is larger than 1 whenever there is positive social interaction
(γ > 0). As noted above, this multiplier could be responsible for spatial variation in
crime rates that is much larger than one would expect on the basis of a model without
endogenous social interactions.
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Figure 1 – Possible equilibria for multiple forms of crime based on φj = −4 and various γ’s.
Brock and Durlauf (2001) provide an analysis of the equilibriums in this model. They
show that for positive values of γ there may exist three equilibria. Figure 2 illustrates this
situation for φj = −4 and various values of γ. For γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.15 there are indeed
three equilibriums. The high and stable equilibrium refers to a situation in which almost
everybody is involved in criminal activities. In the other two equilibriums criminals are a
minority, but the size of the minority differs significantly. The proportion of criminals
equals either 1.5% or, depending on γ, 15%/33%, where the former equilibrium is stable
and the latter is not. This example therefore suggests that the model can be consistent
with the presence of a different proportion of criminals in neighborhoods that are similar
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in all characteristics. Although the exact location of the equilibriums depends on the
values of the parameters, our numerical experiments suggest that the crime rate at the
stable equilibrium with the highest crime rate is unrealistically high.
4. Data
Criminal behavior is notoriously difficult to measure. Because it is morally objectionable
and legally sanctioned, many people are unwilling to confess their involvement in crime,
to law enforcement as well as to researchers. Although quite a few surveys ask adolescent
subjects to report their involvement in criminal conduct (a few examples include Elliott
et al., 1985; Farrington et al., 1996; Wikström et al., 2012) crime self-report surveys are
rare among adult populations (but see Morselli and Tremblay, 2004).
To measure criminal behavior we therefore used anonymized national population data
from the Dutch National Police. The police information system from which the data
were extracted contains data on all individuals that have been arrested by the Dutch
police as criminal suspects in a particular year. It is estimated that more than 90 percent
are subsequently either convicted in court or imposed a fine or community service by the
public prosecutor’s office in lieu of prosecution (this often happens in the case of relatively
minor crimes) (Blom et al., 2005). The data contain some personal characteristics (sex,
age, country of birth, parents’ countries of birth, postal code of residential address) and
also contain details about all crimes of which the individual has been suspected (including
the dates and the types of crime). In the analysis in this paper we use being a suspect of
any crime(s) in the year 2006 as the dependent variable as well as separate indicators
for being suspected of (i) violent and (ii) property crime (of course the two types do
not exclude each other, so that a single person can be suspected of both crimes types
within the same year). Because the police information system is used for investigative
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purposes, it is updated continuously, and updates include changes of address as well as
removal of individuals after an expiration period, the length of which depends on the
seriousness of their criminal record. The database used in this analysis was an archival
copy of the information system, and included crimes already removed from the real
‘living’ information system. Data from special investigative services are excluded, so
that tax and other economic crimes, social security fraud, and environmental crimes are
underrepresented.
There are also some (well-documented) disadvantages to using police records to measure
criminality. First, a substantial percentage of crimes never comes to the attention of the
police, either because there is not an individual victim to report it (e.g., drug dealing) or
because the victim does not report the crime to the police (Goudriaan et al., 2004). Second,
in most jurisdictions the police solve only approximately 20 percent of all crimes (Dodd
et al., 2004). As a consequence, any estimate of criminality based on police data must be
a severe underrepresentation. Third, specific surveillance or investigative strategies used
by the police may result in some areas being more intensely supervised and investigated
than others, resulting in an overrepresentation of these areas in the data. Fourth, police
records have data on suspects, but some of these people may be unjustly suspected and
will not be convicted subsequently in court. Notwithstanding these limitations police
records are the best available large-scale measures of criminality available, and have been
used extensively in previous studies in The Netherlands and abroad.
To obtain a full population dataset on criminal involvement in 2006 in The Netherlands,
we used population data from Statistics Netherlands per January 1st, 2006, which cross-
tabulates neighborhood of residence (4,028 neighborhoods) with age (20 categories, each
5 years width), sex (male versus female), and ethnicity (native versus non-native). As
the police records contain these four variables as well, both sources can be combined
to create a national dataset containing approximately 16 million individuals with the
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following five variables:
1. neighborhood of residence (4,028 neighborhoods);
2. sex (male or female);
3. non-native Dutch (individual or their parent(s) born in a non-western country, or
not)
4. age (20 categories: 0-4 years, 5–9 years, 10–14 years, 15–19 years, etc. );
5. suspected of one or more violent/property crimes in 2006 (yes or no).
Because in The Netherlands only individuals of age 12 and older can be prosecuted, age
categories 0–4 years and 5–9 years were removed from the analysis. Persons aged 10 or
11 are included because the population data are available only in 5-years age categories.
Because no individuals above age 89 were prosecuted in 2006, ages 90 and above were
also removed from the analysis. The remaining dataset contains 14,301,005 individuals
aged 10–89 in 2006.
For this population, Figure 2 displays the number of individuals who were suspected
of criminal involvement during the year 2006, per 1,000 residents of the same sex, age
category and ethnic origin.3 The figure confirms three stylized facts about criminality:
the arrest rates of men are five times larger than those of women (Steffensmeier and
Allan, 1996; Mears et al., 1998), the arrest rates of residents with foreign origin are more
than 3 times larger than those of native Dutch residents (Blokland et al., 2010), and
arrest rates of all groups peak during adolescence and early adulthood at ages 15–24
(Blokland et al., 2005). On average, 1.5 percent of the 10–89 population became a crime
suspect in 2006. For boys in the age category 15–24 years, the percentage is more than
3The data underlying Figure 2 are included in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 2 – Number of criminal suspects in 2006 per 1,000 individuals, by age, sex, and
ethnic origin.
four times larger than the average.
The police records include the six-digit postal codes of the residential addresses of
the individuals. Throughout the Netherlands there are about 435,000 six-digit postal
code areas. In non-rural areas they are roughly the size of a football field and contain
approximately 20 residential properties and 40 residents. As they were created with
pedestrian postal delivery services in mind, single codes are nearly always on the same
street, apply to adjacent properties, and are not subdivided by physical barriers that
impede pedestrian or car transportation. The focus of our investigation is the proportion
of neighborhood residents involved in crime.4 In line with definitions of ‘neighborhood’
as a locus of social interaction elsewhere in the literature, our analysis uses the four-digit
4When the peer group is located in the neighborhood, the chance of interaction with a criminal is
affected not only by the relative number of criminals, but also by the size of the area. Thus, the
social interaction effect can alternatively be defined as the percentage of residents per square mile
exhibiting a given behavior.
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Dutch postal code number as the spatial unit of analysis, i.e. a spatial aggregation of the
six-digit postal code. Following Walker et al. (2011), we assume that“these postal code
boundaries delineate spatial peers and that individuals within a postal code are more
similar, exerting a stronger influence than individuals who live outside of one’s postal
code” (p. 368). Many other studies in The Netherlands have used the four-digit postal
code as a neighborhood delineation criterion (Wilsem et al., 2006; Nieuwbeerta et al.,
2008; Bernasco and Kooistra, 2010).
Substantive arguments for neighborhood as a valid spatial reference group were already
given in the literature overview. There are also several methodological arguments in
favor of the neighborhood (instead of a larger or smaller areal unit). First and foremost,
larger areas such as cities ensconce within-city heterogeneity (and therefore between-
neighborhood differences) in criminality. Secondly, smaller areas than neighborhoods,
such as streets, result in very skewed crime distributions that are more difficult to model
properly. Thirdly, no or very little areal data are available at smaller spatial scales than
neighborhoods. Because previous scholars (e.g., GSS) have used cities as units of analysis,
we bolster our argument for smaller areal units by presenting the percentage of criminal
suspects graphically for both municipalities and neighborhoods in The Netherlands in
Figure 3. Figure 4 provides a view of neighborhoods in Amsterdam, the capital of The
Netherlands. These figures show that the percentage of criminal suspects per municipality
disguises large within-municipality differences. For example, whereas on average 2.2% of
the population of Amsterdam was suspected of a crime in 2006 (and 1.8% and 1.2% for
violent crime and property crime, respectively), the percentage of suspected criminals
per neighborhood ranges from 0% to about 5% (0%–4% and 0%–3% for violent crime
and property crime, respectively). Geographically, the Netherlands is a small country
with a total land surface of 41,526 square kilometers. The total country consists of 4,028
four-digit postal code areas with an average surface of 10.31 square kilometer and an
average population of 4,073 inhabitants. Similar to US census tracts, the sizes of these
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Figure 3 – Percentage of criminal suspects in 2006 per municipality and neighborhood.
‘neighborhoods’ depend on population density. In urban areas where population densities
are high, the surfaces of neighborhoods tend to be relatively small, whereas they are
larger in rural areas where population densities are low.
To account for possible spurious findings, we control for several ubiquitous variables in
criminological research about neighborhood differences in crime. Classic and contemporary
criminological studies have consistently found that high population turnover, ethnic
heterogeneity, low socio-economic status and the presence of one-parent households
correlate with higher crime rates (see Sampson and Groves, 1989; Bursik Jr. And
Grasmick, 1993; Sampson et al., 1997; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). These neighborhood
characteristics are hypothesized to affect crime in two distinct ways: (i) by decreasing
social cohesion and (expectations of) social control; (ii) by impeding proper socialization
by parents and other neighborhood residents of youth. We therefore merge our dataset
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Figure 4 – Percentage of criminal suspects in 2006 Amsterdam neighborhoods.
with two additional neighborhood datasets. The first is the neighborhood data from the
Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics from which we extract address density, percentage
single person households, average household size, number of shops, percentage owner-
occupied housing, school density and percentage single parent households. The second
is the Geomarketing data from WDM Netherlands, which is in itself composed out of
several (marketing) databases. This database gives us information about neighborhood
mobility (in- and outmigration), average level of education, a measure for the average
social class and the number of double income households within a neighborhood.
Finally, it is well conceivable that the impact of social interaction differs with residential
density. Namely, denser neighborhoods might lead to more residential interaction because
meeting probabilities are simply larger. To control for this effect we incorporate an
interaction effect between social interaction and residential density.
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5. Results
Table 1 presents the estimation results of equation (3), omitting the neighborhood specific
constants δj . The socio-demographic variables included are a sex indicator (0 for males, 1
for females), an ethnicity indicator (0 for native Dutch or born in a western country, 1 for
people or one of their parents born in a non-western country), age (measured categorically
as 10–14=-1, 15–19=0, 20–24=1,. . . , 85–89=14, i.e. centered on the peak of the age-crime
curve) and age squared. Of the 4,007 neighborhoods there were 401 in which not a
single resident offended in 2006, making it impossible to estimate a neighborhood specific
constant term for the general model. In 409 neighborhoods not a single violent act of
crime took place and property crime was absent in 802 neighborhoods.5 The estimation
Table 1 – Choice models (log-odds of being suspect of crime in 2006).
All crime Violent crime Property crime
Parameter Estimation S.E. Estimation S.E. Estimation S.E.
Female −1.637 0.0059 −1.885 0.0069 −1.509 0.0085
Non-native 0.783 0.0059 0.743 0.0063 0.957 0.0081
Age 0.070 0.0019 0.109 0.0021 −0.110 0.0030
Age2 −0.026 0.0002 −0.030 0.0003 −0.034 0.0004
# Observations 14,191,721 14,189,082 13,966,926
# Parameters 4 + 3,610 constants (δ) 4 + 3,602 constants (δ) 4 + 3,209 constants (δ)
Log-likelihood −961, 220.0 −855, 499.9 −491, 169.2
results confirm the descriptive statistics visualized in Figure 2. Males and non-natives are
much more likely to become involved in crime than females and native Dutch residents,
and crime involvement first quickly increases with age and then gradually decreases.
While the estimated parameters for violent crime are similar to the estimates for general
crime, the property crime estimates indicate that the age-crime curve for property crime
5Usually, only the smallest neighborhoods with few of no criminals fall out of the estimation, which
might invoke a selection bias. Note, however, that the number of observations decreases much slower
than the number of neighborhoods.
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peaks at younger ages.
A higher value of the neighborhood-specific constant δj means that inhabitants of the
neighborhood are more likely to be involved in crime. Because the first-stage model
only imposes a structure on the effects of individual characteristics, it is silent about the
mechanisms underlying between-neighborhood variation: these have to be sorted out in
the second stage. The kernel density estimates of the shape of the δj distributions are
presented in Figure 5. All three density functions are single peaked and almost symmetric.
The kernel density function of violent crime is similar to that of crime in general, whereas
the kernel density function of property crime clearly has a higher mean and standard
error. Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix report the results of the first stage regression
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Figure 5 – Kernel density estimates of the distribution of δ.
on our social interaction variable (% involved in crime) and interaction effect (% involved
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in crime × # Addresses per hectare/1000 ). Table 2 reports the second stage results
of the regression on the δj ’s. As instruments of % involved in crime and % involved in
crime times # Addresses per hectare/1000 we have used the counterfactual crime rate,
(IE(Cj)), as defined in eqn. (6), and the interaction effect of the counterfactual crime
times the density, (IE(Cj)×Addresses per hectare/1000).
As Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix clearly show, the instruments we use are relevant.
The counterfactual crime rate is very significant and shows a positive correlation with %
involved in crime as expected. The counterfactual crime rate times the density is very
significant as well and shows a positive relation with % involved in crime × # Addresses
per hectare/1000. By construction, the counterfactual crime rate is uncorrelated with
the error term ξ. The results of the second stage estimation are reported in Table 2.
The main conclusion to be taken from the estimates in Table 2 is that the hypothesized
social interaction effect (i.e., the effect of the neighborhood percentage of other residents
involved in crime) is only significantly positive for violent crime, although its substantive
impact is limited. For property crime and for overall crime the effects are completely
insignificant. Thus, whereas it was hypothesized that a social interaction mechanism
would apply to all types of crime but that its role in violent crime would be larger than
its role in property crime, the findings demonstrate that the social interaction only plays
a role in violent crime.
The estimates of the remainder of the variables in the second stage of the 2SLS estimation
are in line with studies on neighborhood level correlates on crime and delinquency, which
generally show that indicators of social and economic disadvantages (low education, low
income, high neighborhood mobility and high proportions of single person and single
parent households) are associated with more crime.6 The large and highly significant
6Our results are robust over years (for the years 2007 and 2008 we get similar results) and to the
specification used. Only if we omit single parent households we get somewhat higher social interaction
effects (up to γ = 0.13–0.15). Using different instruments, in particular the spatial lags of surrounding
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coefficient on the share of single parent households is in line with earlier analyses (notably
Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999).
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Figure 6 – Possible equilibriums for multiple forms of crime based on parameter estimates.
Figure 6 illustrates the equilibriums as implied by the parameter estimates for the various
forms of crime (regardless of the significance of the coefficients), based on the individual
and neighborhood means. In this case, even the statistical significant coefficient for violent
crime is not high enough to create multiple equilibriums. All estimated equilibriums are
low and around the 1%.
Figure 7 illustrates that multiple equilibriums are possible for different values of neigh-
borhood and individual variables. In this case, Figure 7 shows that the impact of the
social interaction effects differs significantly over the whole range of empirical values of
single parent density. For the empirical maximum of one-parent density (55%), multiple
neighborhoods, does, however, significantly increase the social interaction effect (to more than γ =
0.4, which leads to completely criminal neighborhoods, a highly implausible outcome).
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Figure 7 – Possible equilibriums for various values of single parent density.
equilibriums are (just) possible.
6. Discussion
In a critique of the empirical literature on social interactions, Manski (2000) claims
that their analysis would benefit from the performance of well-designed experiments in
controlled environments and from careful elicitation of persons’ subjective perceptions of
the interactions in which they participate. Falk et al. (2010) adopt the first suggestion
and demonstrate social interactions in an experiment on behavior in a public goods game.
However, ethical considerations and IRB regulations prohibit experimental studies of
criminal behavior of the type and severity that we study. Therefore, in the present paper
we chose the second-best alternative, and estimated a structural discrete model using
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state-of-the-art techniques to tease out social interactions with an exceptionally rich and
comprehensive dataset.
On the basis of previous literature it was hypothesized that positive social interactions
play a role in all crime, in particular in violent crime. The results of our analysis partially
confirm this expectation. They indicate a positive and significant, but small, social
interaction effect for violent crime only, but not for property crime or general crime.
Apparently, social interaction is less influential in generating crime than was expected
on the basis of prior research. We suggest that prior research may have overestimated
endogenous social interaction effects by lack of individual data at a detailed spatial
scale. In particular, we demonstrated that there exist huge individual differences in crime
involvement by sex, age and ethnic background, which have hardly been accounted for in
prior research on social endogenous interactions and crime.
Nevertheless, we did find a positive social interaction effect for violent crime. Apart from
violent crime’s reciprocal nature, another interpretation might be that social interactions
apply to violent crime because violent crimes are overt predatory contact crimes that
presume an interaction between the offenders and their victims. In neighborhoods where
individuals live amongst others who are prone to violence, the risk of violent victimization
is relatively high and might be lowered by gaining a reputation of ‘toughness’. Thus,
being a violent offender may deter violent predators and thereby prevent future violent
victimization (Silverman, 2004; Fagan and Meares, 2008; Dur and Weele, 2012). The
large majority of property crimes (larceny, burglary, etc.) are covert crimes that are
perpetrated without any contact between the perpetrator and the victim, and without
the victim being able to identify the perpetrator (and often also vice versa). For this
reason, property offending does not yield any reputation to the perpetrator. Social
interaction effects are therefore unlikely in the case of (covert) property crimes. Note that
one should expect a social interaction effect on robbery, because although its purpose is
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illegal property transfer, unlike other property crimes it involves direct contact between
the perpetrator and the victim.
We conclude by noting some issues for future research. We found the share of single parent
households to be an extremely important variable. We were, however, unable to test the
hypothesis suggested by this finding, viz. that criminals often belong to such households.
Another limitation of our study is that we have assumed that the social interaction effect
is identical for all households whereas it is conceivable that some individuals (young
adolescents, for instance) are more sensitive to such interactions than others. A third
issue that has not been elaborated in this paper is that crime is notoriously difficult to
measure. Some crimes are not reported to the police (more than 50 percent according to
conservative estimates (Goudriaan et al., 2004), and that the police solve only 20 percent
of the recorded crimes (Dodd et al., 2004). The annual percentage of the population
involved in crime is thus an underestimate, and it implies there is some misclassification
in the dependent variable of our analysis. Starting from the other side, there also exists a
small risk of misclassification, namely when the police attributes a crime to an individual
that actually did not perpetrate it. Given the fact that the police will only attribute
it to a person if substantial evidence has been collected (enough for the suspect to be
prosecuted), the likelihood of a ‘false positive’ is quite small. In future research, such
misclassification issues might be dealt with. Lewbel (2000) has shown that binary discrete
choice models with misclassification are non-parametrically identified and Hausman et al.
(1989) provides techniques for estimating this model.
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Table 2 – 2SLS estimation on δ—second stage
All crime Violent crime Property crime
Parameter Estimation S.E. Estimation S.E. Estimation S.E.
% Involved in crime 0.038 0.032 0.068∗ 0.033 −0.098 0.087
% Involved in crime ×
# Addresses per ha./1000 −0.104 0.464 −0.186 0.547 −0.005 1.264
# Addresses per hectare/1000 −0.243 1.201 −0.218 1.240 0.470 1.808
% Single person households −0.168 0.114 −0.261∗ 0.111 −0.084 0.178
% Single parent households 3.246∗∗∗ 0.397 0.589∗∗∗ 0.363 6.239∗∗∗ 0.641
# Persons per household −0.217∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.203∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.583∗∗∗ 0.076
Education1 −0.252∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.239∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.440∗∗∗ 0.044
Social class2 0.059∗∗∗ 0.015 0.067∗∗∗ 0.015 0.056∗ 0.024
Double income households3 −0.062∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.067∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.050∗∗ 0.016
% Out migration4 0.003∗ 0.001 0.003∗ 0.001 0.004∗ 0.002
% In migration5 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 0.010∗∗∗ 0.002
School density −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.002
% Homeowners/1000 0.705 0.597 0.929 0.597 1.097 0.970
# Shops/1000 0.122∗ 0.054 0.131∗ 0.055 0.055 0.084
Intercept 0.694∗∗∗ 0.144 0.668∗∗∗ 0.145 1.779∗∗∗ 0.238
# Observations 3,606 3,598 3,206
R2 0.433 0.432 0.353
Significance levels : ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
1 Education: average education within neighborhood (defined as: 1 is low education; 2 is medium
education; 3 is high education
2 Social class of neighborhood: running from high to low (4 categories: A, B1, B2 and C. For example A
is high income; high education; own house)
3 Double income households in neighborhood: average number of double income households, 9 categories
running from low to high.
4 Out migration: Total number of households that moved house from the neighborhood in the last five
years relative to the total number of neighborhood households (in 10 classes from low to high).
5 In migration: Total number of households that moved house to the neighborhood in the last five years
relative to the total number of neighborhood households (in 10 classes from low to high).
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A. Appendix: Tables
Table A.1 – Number of criminal suspects in 2006 per 1,000 individuals, by age, sex and
ethnic origin.
Male Female Total male and female
Total Total Total Total Grand
Age Native Foreign male Native Foreign female native foreign total
10–14 0.71 2.73 1.02 0.25 0.72 0.32 0.48 1.75 0.68
15–19 4.95 13.46 6.27 1.07 2.63 1.31 3.05 8.20 3.84
20–24 5.15 11.55 6.21 0.86 2.07 1.06 3.03 6.80 3.67
25–29 3.27 8.98 4.17 0.63 1.52 0.78 1.96 5.12 2.47
30–34 2.52 7.62 3.23 0.51 1.37 0.64 1.52 4.40 1.94
35–39 2.31 6.49 2.82 0.54 1.41 0.64 1.43 4.00 1.74
40–44 2.09 5.80 2.50 0.52 1.18 0.59 1.31 3.61 1.56
45–49 1.72 5.16 2.02 0.44 1.11 0.50 1.08 3.18 1.27
50–54 1.36 4.04 1.53 0.32 0.83 0.36 0.84 2.41 0.95
55–59 1.05 2.57 1.13 0.24 0.52 0.26 0.65 1.54 0.70
60–64 0.81 1.86 0.86 0.19 0.29 0.19 0.50 1.13 0.53
65–69 0.60 1.04 0.62 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.35 0.67 0.36
70–74 0.40 0.78 0.41 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.23 0.53 0.24
75–79 0.28 0.65 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.15 0.42 0.16
80–84 0.20 0.43 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.10
85–89 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.07
Total 1.99 7.00 2.49 0.41 1.36 0.50 1.19 4.21 1.49
Source: Statistics Netherlands and Netherlands National Police Services (KLPD)
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Table A.2 – 2SLS estimation on δ—first stage regression on % Involved in crime
All crime Violent crime Property crime
Parameter Estimation S.E. Estimation S.E. Estimation S.E.
IE(Cj) 0.819∗∗∗ 0.046 0.925∗∗∗ 0.051 0.737∗∗∗ 0.065
IE(Cj)× # Addresses
per hectare/1000 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
# Addresses per ha./1000 −2.374 1.802 −0.423 1.713 3.992∗∗ 1.383
% Single person households −0.215 0.202 0.038 0.174 −0.235 0.185
% Single parent households −0.689 0.719 −1.103 0.611 −0.639 0.659
# Persons per household −0.203∗ 0.081 −0.106 0.073 −0.200∗∗ 0.074
Education1 −0.162∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.108∗ 0.041 −0.064 0.040
Social class2 0.002 0.026 −0.001 0.023 0.014 0.023
Double income households3 0.005 0.017 0.002 0.016 0.005 0.015
% Out migration4 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
% In migration5 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002
School density −0.002 0.002 −0.002∗ 0.002 −0.004∗ 0.002
% Homeowners/1000 0.741 1.022 0.891 0.931 −1.451 0.910
# Shops/1000 −0.127 0.094 −0.145 0.085 −0.058 0.079
Intercept 0.114∗∗∗ 0.242 0.668∗∗∗ 0.145 0.944∗∗∗ 0.220
# Observations 3,606 3,598 3,206
R2 0.564 0.519 0.445
Test of excluded instruments 310.14∗∗∗ 303.20∗∗∗ 155.37∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
1 Education: average education within neighborhood (defined as: 1 is low education; 2 is medium
education; 3 is high education
2 Social class of neighborhood: running from high to low (4 categories: A, B1, B2 and C. For example A
is high income; high education; own house)
3 Double income households in neighborhood: average number of double income households, 9 categories
running from low to high.
4 Out migration: Total number of households that moved house from the neighborhood in the last five
years relative to the total number of neighborhood households (in 10 classes from low to high).
5 In migration: Total number of households that moved house to the neighborhood in the last five years
relative to the total number of neighborhood households (in 10 classes from low to high).
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Table A.3 – 2SLS estimation on δ—first stage regression on % Involved in crime × #
Addresses per hectare/1000
All crime Violent crime Property crime
Parameter Estimation S.E. Estimation S.E. Estimation S.E.
IE(Cj) −3.480∗∗ 1.260 −4.144∗∗ 1.397 −3.904∗ 1.706
IE(Cj)× # Addresses
per hectare/1000 0.967∗∗∗ 0.019 0.970∗∗∗ 0.022 0.957∗∗∗ 0.025
# Addresses per ha./1000 287.93∗∗∗ 49.100 279.66∗∗∗ 47.160 180.14∗∗∗ 16.423
% Single person households 8.773 5.511 8.797 4.785 18.138∗∗∗ 4.861
% Single parent households 41.576∗ 19.592 36.816∗ 16.818 20.231 17.367
# Persons per household −3.005 2.214 −2.125 2.009 2.088 1.946
Education1 −6.269∗∗∗ 1.230 −5.525∗∗∗ 1.140 −3.499∗∗ 1.065
Social class2 1.937∗∗ 0.699 1.791∗∗ 0.643 0.787 0.600
Double income households3 2.237∗∗∗ 0.472 1.856∗∗∗ 0.434 1.356∗∗ 0.406
% Out migration4 −0.065 0.054 0.068 0.050 −0.102∗ 0.046
% In migration5 0.032 0.049 0.033 0.044 0.033 0.042
School density −0.073 0.057 −0.055 0.053 −0.036 0.054
% Homeowners/1000 129.91∗∗∗ 27.848 122.59∗∗∗ 25.638 33.215 23.990
# Shops/1000 4.125∗∗ 2.549 4.295 2.353 6.485∗∗ 2.090
Intercept −6.147 6.608 −6.634 6.108 −13.041∗ 5.802
# Observations 3,606 3,598 3,206
R2 0.919 0.907 0.857
Test of excluded instruments 1927.88∗∗∗ 1499.38∗∗∗ 1065.50∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
1 Education: average education within neighborhood (defined as: 1 is low education; 2 is medium
education; 3 is high education
2 Social class of neighborhood: running from high to low (4 categories: A, B1, B2 and C. For example A
is high income; high education; own house)
3 Double income households in neighborhood: average number of double income households, 9 categories
running from low to high.
4 Out migration: Total number of households that moved house from the neighborhood in the last five
years relative to the total number of neighborhood households (in 10 classes from low to high).
5 In migration: Total number of households that moved house to the neighborhood in the last five years
relative to the total number of neighborhood households (in 10 classes from low to high).
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